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ABSTRACT 
We examine the separation of ownership and control in Hong Kong by 
studying a newly assembled sample of 112 publicly listed firms. The 
ultimate owners of all sample corporations were traced with an improved 
methodology. We confirm the existing literature in that family-controlled 
firms are predominant and pyramiding schemes are not rare in Hong Kong. 
Regression results show that the auditing fees corporations pay vary 
positively with ownership concentration of the largest shareholders of the 
sampled corporations and negatively with the separation of ownership and 
control rights of the largest shareholders. We also provide evidence that 
group-affiliated corporations pay significantly more than the stand alone 
ones for auditing services. 
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摘 要 
我 們 建 立 了 一 個 由 一 百 二 十 伙 本 港 上 市 公 司 
組 成 的 資 料 庫 ， 以 硏 究 股 東 控 股 權 與 股 票 擁 有 
權 不 等 的 問 題 。 我 們 查 證 了 資 料 庫 內 所 有 公 司 
最 終 股 東 的 身 份 ， 亦 進 一 步 証 實 文 獻 中 所 指 出 
的 香 港 上 市 公 司 主 要 由 家 族 式 經 營 和 金 字 塔 
式 控 股 的 現 象 並 不 罕 見 的 說 法 。 回 歸 模 型 之 結 
果 顯 示 出 香 港 上 市 公 司 用 於 審 計 的 費 用 與 該 
公 司 單 一 最 大 股 東 的 持 股 量 成 正 比 例 ； 同 時 卻 
反 比 於 單 一 最 大 股 東 的 控 股 權 與 股 票 擁 有 權 
之 間 的 差 距 。 我 們 亦 提 出 証 據 証 明 了 集 團 式 上 
市 公 司 會 比 獨 立 上 市 公 司 花 費 更 多 的 審 計 費 
用° 
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1.1 Agency Theory 
In the times of Berle and Means (1932)，modem business enterprises (MBE) dominated 
most industries of the United States economy. This means the United States and the 
world economy as a whole was dominated by a few large, vertically integrated firms that 
owned and controlled huge amounts of highly specialized inanimate assets that are very 
hard to replicate. This made the firms unique. However, the diverse ownership of the 
firms yields significant power at the hands of the top managers over the assets whose 
interests do not necessarily coincide with that of the shareholders.' This, therefore, forms 
the very basic problem of corporate governance in the context of principal-agent 
paradigm, which concerns how the investors (the principal) ensure that the managers (the 
agent) follow their interests.^ Shareholders have to select good managers at the first place 
(an adverse selection problem), they then have to monitor the managers if the latter 
follow what the interests of the shareholders themselves lie (a moral hazard problem). As 
‘As pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both parties in a relationship are utility 
maximizes, it is not surprising that the agent does not always act in the best interests of the principal. 
2 There are some other definitions of corporate governance other than the standard viewpoint that 
corporate governance should resolve the conflicts between owners and managers of the corporations. For 
example, Raj an and Zingales (2000) argue that given the changing nature of the firm, the focus of corporate 
governance should shift to studying mechanisms that give the firm the power to provide incentives to 
human capital; Tirole (2001) argues that corporate governance should consider the stakeholder societies 
instead of the shareholders' interests only; and some others focus on the conflicts between large and small 
shareholders, which will be discussed in this paper. 
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a result, the pioneers argue that a more concentrated ownership can lead to better 
corporate performance. Specifically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop a theoretical 
framework to show that agency cost attributable to the divergence of interests vary 
inversely with the manager's ownership stake a e (0,1) . As the ownership of the 
owner/manager falls, he or she has the incentive to consume perks or work less diligently 
instead of maximizing the value of the firm on behalf of all shareholders. At the extreme 
when the manager owns nothing of the firm (when = 0)，he or she gains 100% of all 
private consumption but incurs zero cost of the loss in the value of the firm. This, 
however, incurs high agency costs to the owners. As a result, Jensen and Meckling show 
that concentrated ownership is beneficial for corporate performance. Empirical studies 
for the United States largely confirm this view.^ 
1.2 Separation of Large and Small Shareholders 
Nevertheless, there is a growing body of literature that questions the owner-manager-
separation picture of Berle and Means. The recent focus of corporate governance has 
been shifted to the conflicts between large and small shareholders and the resulting 
expropriation by largest shareholders, as well as its likely economic consequences. It is 
now well known that many firms around the world are predominantly controlled by 
3 Levy (1983)，Lease et al (1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Shleifei, and Vishny (1986)， 
McConnell and Servaes (1990)，among others show positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and corporate valuation. However, there are also studies find that the opposite is true. For example, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate valuation. Stulz (1988) argues, with a formal model, that as managerial ownership and control 
increases, entrenchment effect starts to exceed incentive effect. 
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single large shareholders or families. Specifically, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) find that family- or state- controlled firms are predominant in the 27 
wealthiest economies around the world, whereas widely-held firms with diverse 
ownership are far less common than what Berle and Means predicted. Holderness, 
Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) present with evidence that managerial ownership of the 
listed companies in the United States has risen from 13 percent in 1930s to more than 20 
percent in 1995. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) add evidence by showing that 
separation of management from ownership control is rare in East Asian economies too. 
They find "extensive family control in more than half of East Asian corporations" (p. 82), 
a phenomenon which they call "crony capitalism". They, therefore, claim that the 
genuine problem of corporate governance in East Asia, including Hong Kong, is the 
separation of ownership between large and small shareholders. In the Europe continent, 
the figure is not low either, according to Faccio and Lang (2002)."^ 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1997) and La Porta et al, (1998) shape the 
problem of corporate governance by relating the level of (small) shareholder protection 
with the jurisdictions where the sample firms incorporated. They conclude that investor 
protection is the best in common-law countries and the worst in civil-law countries. La 
Porta et al. (2000b) continue their earlier studies by showing that countries of poor 
investor protection often result in less developed and thinner capital markets. Claessens et 
al. (1999)，Lins (2003), and others also have some other important contributions. 
However, though the relationship of ownership structure and corporate governance has 
4 Faccio and Lang (2002) find that 44.29% of corporations are controlled by families in 13 
sampled Western European countries at the 20% control level. 
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been studied extensively, detailed country-specific studies of the above relationship in 
Hong Kong is very limited.^ Examples include Taylor (1998), who studies the Li, Ka-
Shing business group of Hong Kong in details. Besides, a recent article in Hong Kong 
Economic Journal Monthly reports the interconnections of management and board of 
directors' levels of the corporations in Hang Seng Index (Tong, January 2003 issue, p. 4-
18)6. 
At the same time, the East Asian Financial Crisis during 1997 and 1998 urged concerns 
and discussions on practices of the weak corporate governance in the region and other 
emerging markets7 However, as mentioned above, the existing literature focuses largely 
on the role of the largest shareholders ^  on valuation of corporations and the likely 
economic consequences.^ Nevertheless, this is undoubtedly a rather indirect measurement 
of corporate governance since market capitalization of a firm may not always be the 
direct consequence of its governance structure. Market capitalization depends on many 
5 Although Hong Kong, as an economy, is included in the dataset of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), detailed country-specific analysis is very 
limited. 
6 In contrast to the literature, Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue, with a sample of the Standard & 
Poors 500 firms, that family-controlled firms are an effective organization structure, and minority interests 
are not expropriated. 
7 For example, Johnson et al. (2000) focus primarily on the differences in legal systems and the 
strength of legal enforcement across East Asia economies, and show that those with stronger legal 
protection of investors expected less severe exchange rate depreciation during the crisis. Mitton (2002) 
shows that firms with higher disclosure performed better during the same period. Claessens, Djankov, 
Klapper (2003) argue that the less bankruptcy rate of family controlled groups at the same time may come 
at the expense of minority interests. See also Harvey and Roper (1999) for relevant discussions. 
8 See Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Gomes and Novaes (1999) for discussions of the role 
of the second largest shareholders. 
9 An exception is Faccio, Lang and Young (2001), who emphasize the role of dividends in 
expropriation of minority interests in East Asia and West Europe. Besides, La Porta et al. (2000a) show the 
effects of two agency models of dividends on corporate valuations in 33 countries around the globe. 
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other variables which may not be controlled easily. For example, the quality of 
management teams affect significantly with corporate performance yet cannot be 
controlled in economic analysis easily. In addition, there are not well-agreed proxies of 
the corporate valuation.� So at the bottom line, the question is whether we should rely on 
corporate valuation to address the problem of corporate governance. And we suggest that 
this may be a noisy proxy and should not be used. 
1.3 The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance 
To analyze how corporate insiders choose to expropriate minority interests in Hong 
Kong, we choose to look for variables at which the former has greater discretion. 
Auditing fee, a supposed tool for monitoring the management of corporations but in fact 
controlled by the management teams, provides a good platform for which we can see how 
top managements, who are often the largest shareholders of the firms, act to expropriate 
the outsiders. 
The appointment and removal of auditors are regulated by Section 131 of the Companies 
Ordinance in Hong Kong and set under the audit standards adopted by the Hong Kong 
Society of Accountants. By virtue of s. 131(1) every company must appoint an auditor at 
its annual general meeting (AGM) to hold office from the conclusion of that meeting 
until the conclusion of the next AGM. The directors may appoint the first auditors of the 
i°The most commonly used proxies for corporate valuations are market-to-book ratio of assets 
and Tobin's Q. However, there is no definite answer that which measurement is superior to another. 
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company at any time before the first AGM to hold office until the conclusion of that 
meeting by virtue of s. 131(3). The client is the company and there is an engagement 
letter that ensures a certain degree of confidentiality to allow the auditors to perform their 
tasks. 
The auditor remuneration is negotiated between the company (effectively the board of 
directors or its audit committee) and the auditors by virtue of s. 131(8) of the Company 
Ordinance. It is usual for the auditor to be appointed by the general meeting to leave it to 
the directors to fix the remuneration by agreement at a later stage. In short, the clients 
themselves have some influences in the amount of audit fee they are going to pay. 
External auditing plays a role to solve the problem of moral hazard in agency theory. It 
can be explained as a type of bonding expenditure by the agent who "expends resources 
to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to 
ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does not take such actions" under the 
terminology of Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308).^' If agency theory is true, we would 
expect the auditing fee spent to monitor the manager, decided by the (audit committees 
of) board of directors, rises when the ownership stake of any single investor increases. 
However, if the largest shareholder is also the manager of the firm, this increase may 
become less evident as any strengthening of external monitoring implies decrease in 
“Agency cost is the sum of monitoring cost, bonding expenditure, and residual loss in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). 
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private perk enjoyed. The decision to choose the monitoring level of such large 
shareholders-dominated firms is therefore depends on two conflicting factors. 
Consequently, the effect of ownership stake of largest shareholder or the corporate 
insiders on auditing fee is not clear in the literature. On one hand, a higher level of 
monitoring level benefits the firm by narrowing the creditability gap between the firm 
and outside investors. By releasing more closely investigated information to the market, 
the large shareholders benefited since the now higher level of confidence and trust of the 
outside investors tend to increase the valuation of the firm. In other words, the values of 
their own shares increase as well. Therefore, large shareholders have an incentive to 
choose a higher standard of external auditing. Equivalently, firms that are controlled by 
shareholders who own relative small proportion of the company shares may want to 
reduce financial transparency and lower auditing fee since the benefit is much limited. 
On the other hand, the entrenchment effect dominates if the insider control exceeds their 
ownership, primarily achieved through control-enhancement tools like pyramids, cross-
holdings, multiple classes of shares, among others (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) again). This is because the now 
increased level of external auditing increases the risk of disclosures of fraud and 
irregularities of their firms. Such misstatements of the financial reporting, if found, can 
significantly reduce their personal benefits (say, private perks) in the firms. As a result, 
we expect a negative relationship between auditing fee and the extent at which control 
differs from ownership. In conclusion, the two conflicting factors for the large 
12 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue when the ownership of a large shareholder gets beyond a 
certain point she gains nearly full control of the firm and is able to generate private benefits that are not 
shared by the minority interests. 
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shareholders in choosing the levels of external auditing make the choices more difficult 
and need further investigations. This forms one of the main purposes of this paper. 
In a related aspect, we also investigate the effects of group-affiliation in this paper, 
following Faccio, Lang and Young (2001)，by figuring out how the audit fee changes 
when a sampled firm is labeled as group-affiliated, which is traditionally viewed as less 
transparent in terms of information disclosures. As a result, we conjecture that such firms 
are willing to spend more on auditing in order to narrow the information gap between 
insiders and the outside investors. 
We also analyze the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure 
by improving the methodology in the literature. We investigate the separation of 
ownership and control and their effects on auditing fees in a newly assembled data of 112 
publicly traded companies in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with special attention on 
the interconnection of companies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
draws the framework of corporate governance in Hong Kong. Chapter 3 describes the 
construction of our data. Chapter 4 presents the patterns of ownership and control in 
Hong Kong and shows how we trace the ultimate largest shareholders of the sample 
corporations. Chapter 5 provides three typical examples of the ownership structures in the 
economy. Chapter 6 presents our multivariate analyses in a regression framework. 
Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes this paper. 
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Chapter 2 
The Framework of Corporate Governance 
and External Auditing in Hong Kong 
2.1 The Framework of Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong, a former colony of Britain, follows the British colonial rules in the stock 
market. After the change of sovereignty on 1 July 1997, the UK Privy Council ceased to 
be the court of final appeal for Hong Kong and was replaced by the Court of Final 
Appeal of Hong Kong SAR. By and large, the establishment of liability under Hong 
Kong law so far tended to follow the same route in law as the UK and certain other 
common law jurisdictions. 
The levels of investor protections of most blue-chip companies are among the highest 
standards comparable to that in Western Europe and Northern America since most of 
these large companies have various levels of business connections with firms in United 
States and Europe where the laws and policies of investor protections are more well-
developed. By immersing deeply in these jurisdictions where investor protection is more 
important, the blue chips do have higher levels of investor protection. In La Porta et al. 
(1998，2000，2002) and others, Hong Kong is classified under the "high investor 
protection" category, as contrast to many economies in the region. After the reunification 
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to China, more and more Mainland China companies list their stocks in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, commonly known as the red chips or H-shares, depending on the 
ultimate owners of the corporations. Originating and operating in an investor protection 
environment that differ much from that of the West, the standards of corporate 
governance of these China related companies are often not comparable to that of the blue 
chips.13 In fact, as a well-established financial center in the region, corporate governance 
practices, accounting standards as well as disclosure of information of the biggest 
corporations in Hong Kong are among the highest standards in the world. However, 
smaller companies, whether Hong Kong based or China related, are often notorious for 
poor governance practices and not transparent in terms of information disclosures. 
Different means of expropriating minority interests like rights issues or private 
placements are not rare, though guidelines of corporate governance are available in the 
economy. 
The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance of Hong Kong requires listed 
companies to "record interests of the directors in the equity or debt securities of the 
company and its associated corporations, or rights to subscribe for equity or debt 
securities of the company granted to any directors or their respective spouse or children 
under 18 years of age, or the exercise of any such rights" (Section 29). Corporations 
usually disentangle directors' interests into personal interests, family interests, corporate 
13 However, corporate governance standards in China have been steadily improving. Its recent 
proposal to require listed companies to file quarterly financial statements from 2002 onwards is among one 
of the examples. 
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interests, and other interests .The ordinance also mandates the companies to "record the 
names of all parties which are, directly or indirectly, interested in 10% or more of the 
nominal value of the share capital of the company and the respective relevant shares in 
which they are, and/or are deemed to own" (s. 16.1). This forms the basis of the 
construction of ownership data of our sample” 
In addition, the Code of Best Practice of corporate governance issued by the former Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong in 1996 also contemplates mandatory disclosure concerning 
compliance with its recommendations.'^ It also mandates directors to disclose their 
relevant interests in the company and related ones in the business groups, no matter the 
size of their holdings. It also describes the board's responsibilities to disclose accurate 
information about the agenda items, prior to the annual general meetings of shareholders. 
However, the Code of Best Practice in Hong Kong is rather weak in other perspectives, 
when compared to the counterpart in other economies. For example, it simply refers to 
directors' obligations to ensure compliance with listing rules as well as with the 
"declaration and undertaking" that directors are required to execute and lodge with the 
Exchange. There are no restrictions on selections of bo aid members, the size of board, 
I 
14 Family interests usually represent shares held by the spouse of the director. Corporate interests 
represent shares held by companies in which the director is deemed to be entitled under the Securities 
(Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance to exercise or control one third or more of the voting power at their 
general meetings. Other interests usually represent shares held by directors as trustees. 
The Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571)，commenced on April 1, 2003, has now 
repeal the old Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Chapter 396) by posting stricter regulation on 
disclosure of interests to mandate disclosures of the name of all parties which directly, or indirectly, 
interested in 5% or more of the nominal value of the share capital of the company and the respective 
relevant shares in which they are, and/or are deemed to own. 
16 Commencing with the directors' report, annual accounts and interim reports for periods ending 
on or after 3 ”�December 1995，all listed companies in Hong Kong must include in their annual and interim 
reports a compliance with the Code of Best Practice (Guideline 16.2). 
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components of inside and outside directors, nor clear definition of independence with 
regards to "independent non-executive directors", "independent committees", and others. 
More importantly, separation of chairman and CEO is not restricted in any sense. As a 
result, owner-manager duality is not rare among listed corporations in Hong Kong. (See, 
for example, Tong (2003)). Therefore, compliance with the Code of Best Practice and 
fulfillment of the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance do not imply that the 
standards of corporate governance of such firms are high. 
2.2 The Framework of External Auditing in Hong Kong 
Auditing exist as early as in the twelve century in England, which mean to hear. The 
emergence of large industrial and commercial companies and the separation of ownership 
and control in modem corporations stress the importance of auditing. The report of the 
American Accounting Association Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts states that 
"auditing is a systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence 
regarding assertions about economic actions and events to assertions and established 
criteria and communicating the results to interested users (1973，p.8)，’. In other words, 
auditing is a process of lending credibility to the financial (accounting) statements 
prepared by corporate insiders. 
The primary duty of a company auditor in Hong Kong is to express an independent 
opinion on the "truth and fairness" of the published financial statements (which are 
12 
prepared by the corporate insiders) to the shareholders of the company being audited. 
However, under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) of Hong Kong, the 
auditor merely has a duty to report any fraud discovered to the company's board of 
directors, or its audit committee, if applicable. Nevertheless, disclosures of such frauds, if 
any, are designed upon the decision of the board of directors of the corresponding 
company. 
Clearly, industries whose information transparency is low should care more about 
external auditing. This is because high degree of information asymmetry can increase the 
cost of capital of the firms, and thus their profitability and market values. Therefore, we 
must account for the differences in audit fees resulted from industry effect. Industry-
adjusted audit fee is therefore employed for the purpose of this paper. This question will 
be further investigated in full in chapter 6 under the regression framework. 
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Chapter 3 
Construction of the Data 
3.1 Assembly of the Primary Data 
The analysis of this paper is based on newly assembled data of 112 publicly traded 
corporations, including financial and non-financial institutions in the Hang Seng Hong 
Kong Composite Index (HSHKCI), one of the two constituting indexes of Hang Seng 
Composite Index (HKCI). The Hang Seng Composite Index Series was launched on 3 
October 2001. It aims at, according to the H.S.I. Service Limited, providing a 
comprehensive benchmark of the performance of the Hong Kong stocks market. The 
index comprises the top 200 listed companies in terms of market capitalization, and is 
composed of two distinct series: the geographical series and the industry series. Under the 
classification of geographical series, companies are divided into two groups, HSHKCI 
and Hang Seng Mainland Composite Index (HSMCI). Corporations in HKCI are 
recognized as constitute stocks of HSHKCI if they derive the majority of their sales 
revenue from Hong Kong or places outside Mainland China, and are classified as 
constitute stock of the latter, HKMCI, if they derive at least 50% of their sales revenue 
from mainland China. HSHKCI is further broken down into Hang Seng HK LargeCap, 
MidCap, and SmallCap Indexes according to their market capitalization. HKMCI is 
divided into Hang Seng China Enterprises Index and Hang Seng China-Affiliated 
Corporations Index. The structure is reprinted in Figure 1. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Since the structures and requirements of mandate external auditing is not the same in 
Hong Kong and Mainland China, we therefore decide not to analyze the relationship of 
ownership structures and auditing fees in both economies in a single paper. Inclusions of 
the corporations of HSMCI would bias toward finding much more state-owned 
enterprises whose objectives may not always coincide with that of privately owned ones. 
As a consequence, we collect financial data of corporations in HSHKCI only. 
Before starting to describe how the data are collected, it is important to define some 
important and critical variables. We define ownership right (O) of the largest shareholder 
in a company as the percentage of the shares the largest shareholder holds out of the total 
shares issued by the firm. Similarly, we define control right (C) of such large shareholder 
as the percentage of voting shares held by him/her out of the total voting shares issued. 
By combining O and C, we define the ratio of ownership to control right of the largest 
shareholder (O/C) in any corporation by dividing his/her ownership right by his/her 
control right in that company. Clearly, the lower the O/C ratio, the more severe is the 
problem of corporate governance in the company. 
Now we turn to the description of the construction of the dataset. As the starting point in 
data collection, we check the Worldscope 1998 database, which the literature relies 
15 
heavily in analyzing the separations of ownership and control rights. 口 However, we find 
more than occasionally that some of the ownership and control data are missing or 
incomplete, and the data on auditing fee corporations spent are not available readily. 
Since Worldscope 1998 reports financial data of corporations at the end of 1996，we find 
that it would be extremely difficult to fill the missing financial data, as company reports 
of 1996 are generally not available. 
In addition, we have questions about the accuracy of the data in Worldscope. For 
example, the database reports both the ownership and control rights of the largest 
shareholder of HSBC Holdings PLC (0005.hk; see Figure Al as well) to be 20%, the 
counterparts of that of the Bank of East Asia (0023.hk; Figure A2) and Giordano 
International Limited (0709.hk), as reported in Worldscope, are 26% and 21% 
• 18 
respectively. Should the companies mentioned have such substantial shareholders at 
that time, they must have been disclosed in the company annual reports. However, no 
evidence of such figures from any sources is available. We therefore conclude that the 
Worldscope may not be an accurate data source, particularly for small samples like that 
of ours. Due to this absence of accurate hand-on data sources, we turn to primary 
sources, including company annual reports and interim reports, which we believe to be 
the most accurate. We also rely extensively on all relevant web sites. In all cases, we 
collect ownership and auditing information at the end of December 2001, or the possibly 
“For example, the whole lines of researches of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(hence after LLSV), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, and Lins and Servaes (1999a, b) use the 
Worldscope database as the source of ownership structures of corporations all over the world. 
18 The ownership rights equal to the corresponding control rights for all of the three cases, as 
reported in the Worldscope 1998 version. 
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closest dates. The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) mandates 
disclosures of the names and immediate owners of all owners that hold more than 10% of 
a company's stock in its annual report. This forms the basis of our ownership da t a .��We 
collect the auditing fee data from the same sources. HKEx also mandate the disclosures 
of auditor's remuneration in the section notes to financial statements of the annual 
reports. We would therefore be able to pick up the information on a firm-by-firm basis. 
After all, we are able to trace financial data of 112 corporations in HSHKCI; others are 
either unavailable or incomplete.^' The identities of the major shareholders, if any, of the 
sampled corporation, as well as their ownership rights, control right, and the ratios of 
their ownership rights to control rights are shown in Table Al in the appendix. 
3.2 Traces of the Identities of the Ultimate Owners 
As mentioned earlier, the annual reports disclose the immediate owners that hold more 
than 10% of the listed corporations only. We therefore have to trace the ultimate owners 
of the 112 corporations in the sample by looking at annual reports of the "immediate 
19 Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited, and Hong 
Kong Securities Clearing Company Limited merged to form a single holding company, the HKEx, in 2000. 
20 As mentioned in chapter 2 of this paper, the restriction of disclosure of interests is strengthening 
now. Commencing on April 1,2003, the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance of Hong Kong (Cap. 
571) requires shareholders who have an interest in 5% or more of the shares of a listed corporation 
(substantial shareholders) to give notice of interests in voting shares of listed corporations in certain 
specified circumstances. It also requires a director or a chief executive, who is interested in the shares or 
debentures of a listed corporation (of which he is a director or chief executive) or any of its associated 
corporations, to give notice in certain specified circumstances. 
21 Three companies are therefore dropped in this process. 
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owners" and other sources. However, as in many other countries, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchanges does not ask disclosures of ultimate owners of the substantial shareholdings. 
By immediate owner, it merely means the direct owner of the company, which could be 
the name of another corporation, either publicly traded or privately owned. For example, 
JCG Holdings Limited (0626.hk; see Figure A3) reports its only substantial shareholder 
as "Public Bank Berhad", which holds 59.3% of its ownership rights, without providing 
much details of this firm. We therefore search in the Internet for the company homepage 
of this bank and reveal that it is a listed corporation in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in Malaysia. We then look for the annual report of 2001 of Public Bank Berhad and find 
that its largest shareholder and ultimate owner is Teh, Hong-Piow, a Malaysian 
businessman, who controls 26.92% of the issued capital of the bank. As a result, we 
record the ultimate shareholder of JCG as Teh, Hong-Piow, with 15.963% ownership 
rights and 26.92% control rights (the methodology leading to these figures will be 
explained in the next chapter). 
Sometimes the paths toward the ultimate owners include privately traded companies. In 
such situations, we try to recognize their owners with the aid of the World Wide Web. If 
we fail to identify their owners, we then classify them as wholly owned by the ultimate 
owners, as is in Faccio and Lang (2002). An example is Moulin International Holdings 
Limited (0389.hk; see Figure A4), which reports only one substantial shareholder, KFL 
Holdings Limited, which accounts for 40.821% of its ownership rights. KFL Holdings is 
controlled by BNP Jersey Trust Corporation, a trustee of various family trusts of the Ma, 
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Bo-Kee family, of which the chairman of Moulin, Ma, Bo-Kee, is a beneficial owner, 
according to the annual report of Moulin. However, the ownership right of BNP Jersey 
Trust in KFL holdings is not expressed explicitly in the annual report of Moulin. After 
searching in other possible sources we find that KFL Holdings is not publicly traded, and 
its ownership structure is not available in any way. We therefore assume that KFL 
Holdings is wholly owned by BNP Jersey Trust, which is in turn wholly owned by the 
family trusts of Ma, Bo-Kee family, who is regarded as the largest shareholder of Moulin 
and accounts for 41.445% in both ownership and control rights after considering all 
control-enhancing tools employed. Since it is generally more difficult to identity 
corporations with concentrated owners than to conclude their absence, the percentage of 
diverse corporations (firms without significant concentrated owners) in the sample may 
well be overestimated. 
3.3 Construction of the Industry-Adjusted Audit Rate Data and Some 
Descriptive Statistics 
Auditing fee data are also collected from annual reports, as pointed out earlier. By virtue 
of Section 131(8) of the Company Ordinance, the amount of the remuneration must be 
shown under a separate heading in the company's profit and loss account and it must 
include all sums payable by way of expenses. 
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We adjust for the size effects by dividing the raw data of auditing fee by total turnover of 
the financial year. In some industries like banking where the figures of turnover are not 
available, we use total interest revenue instead. In other cases, revenues are used. In cases 
when corporations use USD as the reporting currency, we convey the figures into HKD 
by the exchange rate of 7.80 HKD per unit of USD. In all cases, we define auditing rate 
{Audit) as the percentage of auditing fee spent as a proportion of the total turnover 
(revenue) of the year. The average of this unadjusted auditing rate is 0.144% for the 
sample corporations in the financial year 2001. This result is reprinted in panel A of 
Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel B of Table 1 lists four t statistics for the difference between the means of auditing 
rate of the sample corporations under four different classification criteria. The first 
concerns the effects of industry effects on auditing fee a corporation spends. There are a 
total of nine industries in the sample, classified according to their core businesses and 
income sources. These industries include banking, conglomerate, financial institution, 
hotel and tourism, manufacturing, media, property and construction, technology, and 
utility and government regulated. As the sample sizes of some individual industries are 
too small to be meaningful, we also divide the whole sample into two large sectors, the 
transparent and opaque sectors. The former includes industries where the structures are 
clear and easy-to-monitor. This includes the corporations in banking, conglomerate, hotel 
and tourism, media, and utility and government regulated. The latter, which constitutes 
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the five remaining industries, constitutes of industries whose businesses and structures 
are less transparent and more difficult to monitor.22 The test of mean of companies 
between the two sectors is statistically significant at 1 percent level, where the mean of 
the opaque sector is higher than that of the transparency sector since the information gap 
in the former sector is wider. This, therefore, shows that the industry effects on 
determinations of auditing fee spent is plausible. 
We follow Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) when defining group affiliation. A 
corporation is said to be "group affiliated" when any one of the following criteria is 
satisfied, {i) it is controlled by a shareholder via pyramiding; {ii) it controls another 
corporation in the sample; {Hi) it has the same controlling (ultimate) shareholder as at 
least one other corporation in the sample; or (/v) its controlling shareholder is a firm with 
diverse ownership, either financial or non-financial. 
Our definition of owner-manager duality borrows from that in Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000). Duality is recognized when "a member of the controlling family or an 
employee of the controlling widely held [firms] is the CEO, chairman, honorary 
chairman, or vice-chairman of the company" (p. 94). We collect this information mainly 
from the section biographical details of directors and senior managers in the company 
annual reports. However, since the disclosures of this information are not legally required 
22 Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) have used the same terminology to classify corporations in 
different industries. They, however, classify industries according to the average of percentage of R&D 
expenses spent in the industry. R&D expenses, however, are not always available in the annual reports of 
the corporations in Hong Kong, and thus we cannot classify our sample corporations in this dimension. 
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there are cases that insufficient information is disclosed to make reasonable judgments. In 
such cases, we seek for other possible sources. 
The last classification criterion concerns the uses of control-enhancing mechanisms by 
the concentrated (large) shareholders. When any kinds of such mechanisms are 
employed, we expect differences between ownership and control rights for the ultimate 
shareholders. In other words, the ratio of ownership to control rights, O/C, is less than 
one. In the absence of these mechanisms, this ratio is exactly one. Detailed descriptions 
of the ownership and control variables are delegated to the next section. 
That the results of the tests of means under this three classification criteria, as printed in 
Panel B of Table 1，are not statistically significant at standard levels does not imply 
uselessness or redundancy of these variables. In fact all of them are proved to be 
important in the multivariate analyses. One reason for the insignificance of these 
descriptive statistics is the industry effects among the corporations. As a tool to alleviate 
agency costs between insiders and outside investors, we expect the auditing fees spent by 
corporations in different industries vary according to their contractual costs due to the 
differences in business structures. We therefore adjust for industry effects on individual 
company by subtracting the mean industry audit rate for the sample corporations from the 
unadjusted (raw) auditing rate {Audit). This leads to the companies' industry-adjusted 
(lA) auditing rate (lAAudit), the dependent variable in our regressions analyses. 
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To account for other firm- and industry-specific factors in determining the relationship of 
ownership structures and auditing fees, we also include some more variables in our 
regression analyses. The data we need also come from the company annual reports and 
interim reports. These include total assets, total debts, cash flows, the auditors employed, 
among others. The results of these multivariate analyses will be shown in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Ownership and Control Patterns 
4.1 An Improved Research Methodology 
We analyze the ownership and control rights of corporations by studying all shareholders 
who control over 10% of the issued capital (which we call substantial shareholders), and 
all members of the board of directors of the firms. In most cases, the substantial 
shareholders, or the immediate owners disclosed in the company annual reports, are 
themselves corporate entities, not-for-profit foundations, financial institutions, or trustees 
of some forms of family trusts whose beneficial owners are usually the chairmen of the 
corporations and their family members. We follow the customs in the literature by not 
distinguishing among individual family members and use the family group as a unit of 
analysis, as is in La Porta et al (1998，2002)，La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999)，Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000), Faccio, Lang and Yeung (2001), Faccio and 
Lang (2002), Claessens et al (2002), among others, and at the same time, improve their 
methodology by looking closer into the relationship of individual directors, particularly 
those with high ownership stakes but different family names. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Claesems, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
are the first attempts to trace the ultimate owners in the literature. They assume 
shareholders with the same last names as coming from the same family groups. This is 
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undoubtedly a great and important contribution to the literature. However, this exercise 
may oversimplify the real situation, in particular in Chinese societies where common last 
names is more frequent than in many other nationalities. For example, Yue Yuen 
Industrial (Holdings) Limited (0551.hk; see Figure A5) reports in its annual report that 
there are two major ultimate owners, Tsai, Chi-Jui and Tsai, N. F. David. However, none 
of any part of the company annual report or the company homepage of Yue Yuen, as well 
as other primary and secondary sources reveals that the two common-last-name directors 
have any family connection. We therefore conclude that they are not from the same 
family even though they have the same family name. This implies that their ownership 
and control stakes must be treated separately, and not in a single unit for analytical 
purposes. 
On the contrary, directors with different last names may in fact belong to the same family 
group. As a result, again, simply assuming directors with the same last name into a single 
family-unit is not the best way to analyze the ownership stakes for a family group. For 
example, Orient Overseas (International) Limited (0316.hk; see Figure A6), the family 
business of Tung, Chee-Hwa, the current Chief Executive of HKSAR, reports that both 
Tung, C. C. (director and CEO) and King, Roger (executive director) own some issued 
capital of Orient Overseas. In previous studies, they are treated as different family groups 
since their last names differ from one another. However, closer investigations of the 
details of the directors reveal that King, Roger is the brother-in-law of Tung, C. C., and 
their respective shares should be pooled and considered as a single unit for analysis. In 
another case, Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited (0433.hk; see Figure A7) 
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discloses two substantial shareholders, Xian, Yong-Wei and Xu, Zhe-Cheng. Again, the 
differences of their last names lead to the conclusion that they are not in the same family 
unit in the existing literature. Nevertheless, biographical information from the company 
report shows that Ms. Xu is the wife of Mr. Xian, and their shares should be combined 
together for analysis. Other examples like this are not rare. Therefore, we believe this 
closer investigation is necessary and meaningful to improve the methodology in the 
literature. 
4.2 Discussions of Ownership and Control Patterns 
We study the separation of ownership and control by the data on both ownership and 
control rights, which are calculated using the complete chains of ownerships. As in the 
existing literature, ownership is defined as the proportion of cash flow rights. This is 
similar to a e (0,1) in the agency theory. On the other hand, control is defined as the 
proportion of voting rights of the issued voting shares. To enhance control, pyramid is a 
common choice among the sampled corporations in the economy, as noted in Claesens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000). However, multiple classes of shares and cross holdings are 
rare. This is consistent with the results of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)， 
Claseesns, Djankov and Lang (2000), Nenova (2001), and others. In fact, Swire Pacific 
Limited is the only firm issues different class of shares, which are listed separately in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. That is, Swire Pacific Limited "A" (0019.hk) and Swire 
Pacific Limited "B" (0087.hk). Both classes of shares have the same amount of voting 
26 
rights but differ in par values.^^ For cross-holdings, Henderson group is the only one in 
the sample whose firms hold shares of each other. Specifically, Henderson Land 
Development Company Limited (0012.hk) controls 73.07% of the issued capital of 
Henderson Investment Limited (0097.hk) directly and indirectly through its subsidiaries. 
Henderson Investment in turn controls 28.708% of the control rights of another listed 
company, The Hong Kong and China Gas Company Limited (0003.hk). This utility 
corporation controls 0.325% of the shares of Henderson Land in return, a typical example 
of cross holdings. See Figure A8 for details. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the distinction between ownership and control rights can 
differ significantly after repeated uses of pyramiding by the ultimate owners or families. 
For example, if a family owns 18% of Firm A directly, which in turn owns 25% of Firm 
B, then we say Firm B is controlled through a pyramid at the 10% and 20% cutoff levels. 
However, we classify Firm B as a firm without concentrated owner at the 40% cutoff 
level, and no pyramid is recorded. If, instead, Firm B is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Firm A, no pyramid is recorded as well. In all cases, we say that the family owns about 
4.5%, or (0.18*0.25) of the ownership rights of Firm B. On the other hand, control 
rights are defined as the weakest link in the control chain. That is, the minimum control 
stakes along the chain of the pyramids for the large shareholders. Therefore, the family 
controls niin(0.18,0.25), or 18% of the control rights in Firm B, as is in Claessens, 
Djankov, Lang (2000). 
23 Note that Swire "A" and Swire "B", though listed separately, represent the different classes of 
shares of the same corporation. Ownership structures, auditing fee, as well as other financial data are 
provided in the same annual report as a single unit. In other words, only one set of data of Swire appears in 
the dataset. 
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In addition, Firm B is controlled through a multiple control chain if it has an ultimate 
owner who "controls it via a multitude of control chains" (Faccio and Lang (2002), p. 
372). In the example just above, further assume that the family owns 9% of Firm B 
directly besides the pyramidal scheme. Then the ownership and control rights of the 
family in Firm B are 13.5% (or 0.18*0.25 + 0.09) and 27% (or mm(0.18,0.25)+ 0.09) 
respectively. Multiple control chains are very common is our sample. This complicates 
the ownership structures of the corporations in Hong Kong, at least for firms that 
ultimately controlled by families. The mechanism of multiple control chains will be 
demonstrated with the aid of three typical ownership structures in the next chapter. Note 
that pyramiding and multiple control chains do not imply one another. In other words, a 
firm can be controlled through multiple chains yet no pyramiding is adopted. 
We find that separation of ownership and voting rights is common in Hong Kong by 
using our data set. Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000) and La Porta et al (2002) have 
performed similar tasks using ownership data from Worldscope 1998. Their results are 
therefore reprinted for comparisons. Table 2 describes these results. Panel A shows the 
statistics of ownership rights (O), Panel B shows that of control rights (C), and Panel C 
for that of ratios of ownership to control rights (0/C). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We find that the largest shareholders of the sampled companies in Hong Kong own 
38.39% of the issued shares of their corporations on average. Consistent with the 
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literature, the average control right of them is higher than their ownership right, which is 
44.60% in the sample. Both the statistics of ownership and control rights are highest in 
our findings (38.39%0, 44.60%)compared to the two other studies. La Porta et al. (2002) 
follows that of ours (32.0%0, 42.0%C), and Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000) being 
the smallest (24.3%0, 28.08%C). The differences of statistics between the two earlier 
studies and that of ours are largely due to size effects. The proportion of large companies 
is highest in La Porta et al, (2002), since they only incorporate the 20 largest companies 
in each economy, and lowest in Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000), as they include 330 
listed companies in Hong Kong. 
In addition, panel C shows the mean of the ratio of ownership to control right is 0.841， 
similar to that of Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000), which is 0.882. One striking result 
worth noting here is that though average at 0.882, the median of the 0/C ratio in our 
findings is 1.000, and that of the first quartile is 0.667. This implies that less than half of 
the companies in the sample employ control-enhancing mechanisms, even though the 
separation of ownership and control rights is statistically significant at one percent 
level.24 Nevertheless, it does not imply that such separation is not important, since the 
economic consequences of such cases are important, even though not every business 
groups in the economy adopt such policies. 
24 The studenW statistic for difference in means between ownership rights (O) and control rights 
(C) in the full sample {n = 112) is 2.5099 base on the figures in Table 2. 
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4.3 Ownership and Control by Owner Types 
Due to the lack of management expertise and high agency costs, small shareholders have 
problems in organizing themselves. The result is that they do not have much say in the 
everyday operations of their corporations. In other words, the largest shareholders who 
hold substantial proportions of the control rights of the corporations (and others in their 
business groups) effectively gain the de facto control. In other words, a > 0.5 , a 
sufficient condition of de jure control, is not necessary for effective controls of a modern 
corporation. Therefore we define, as is standard in the literature, that such owner as the 
"controlling shareholder" at different specified percentage of voting rights. We consider 
three cutoff levels in this paper: 10 percent, 20 percent and 40 percent. Both 10-percent 
and 20-percent cutoff levels have been used in earlier studies like La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Claesens, Djankov and Lang (2000). This allows for easy 
comparisons. Besides, the 40-percent cutoff level reveals how controls of the publicly 
traded corporations change if stricter conditions is required for effective controls. 
If such a large shareholder exists in a particular control level, we define the firm as a 
corporation with concentrated owner at that control level. If no shareholder holds at least 
the cutoff level of control rights, then we define that corporation as corporation without 
concentrated owner (or ‘‘diverse”) at that level. In the spirit of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999)，and among others, we define three types of concentrated owners 
below. We define ' 'Family firms as corporations whose largest owner is an individual, a 
family, or any unlisted corporations that we are not able to trace out its control stakes, as 
30 
is in Faccio and Lang (2002). We call it a “State,, firm if a corporation whose 
concentrated owner is a national government, local authority, or government agency. In 
our case, the concentrated owners of most of the state-owned firms are either the Chinese 
national government or the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR). Finally, we define a firm as “Corporate Entity” when its concentrated owners 
are widely held corporations, either financial or non-financial.^^ The relationship between 
different owner types is reprinted in Figure 2, while the description of control rights by 
different owner types at various control levels is shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
First of all, it should be noted from Table 3 that the control of the publicly traded 
companies in the sample do not change at all when the definition of the de facto control 
switch from 10-percent cutoff level to 20-percent one. This is easy to understand, should 
we realize that ultimate owners in Hong Kong typically own more than 20 percents of the 
control rights of their corporations. At both cutoff levels, families are the predominant 
controlling shareholders in Hong Kong, which control some 79.4% of the sampled 
25 To avoid confusion, it is necessary to point out that La Porta et al. (1999)，Claesens et al 
(2000), and others define "widely-held" instead of "corporation without concentrated owner，’ in this paper. 
They decompose "corporate entity" in this paper into "widely-held financial" and "widely-held 
corporation" depending on the type of the corporate entities. They also define "miscellaneous" as firms 
whose ultimate owners are charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, or minority foreign investors. 
This category, however, is not present in our sample and thus not listed above. Due to these amendments, 
"corporate entity" in Table 3 incorporates both "widely-held financial" and "widely-held corporation" in 
these earlier studies. 
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corporations. State-owned corporations come after, representing about one-tenth (11.8%) 
of the total companies in the sample, most of which are China-affiliated. 
However, the picture of ownership patterns changes dramatically when control is defined 
at 40-percent level. Now, the proportion of family-controlled firms greatly reduced to 
48.04%, which is still the most commonly observed owner type in Hong Kong. At the 
same time, firms with no concentrated owner increases substantially to 36.27%. The 
corresponding figure of state-owned corporations remains relatively stable (at 10.8%) at 
this high control level. 
These results imply that families typically own less than 40 percents of the control rights 
of their controlling companies, a severe problem from the perspectives of agency theory. 
The relative stability in the proportion of state-owned corporations at different control 
levels implies a less severe agency cost with regards to state-owned corporations. In fact, 
the concentrated owners of state-owned enterprises often own control more than 51 
percents of the ownership rights of the firms. Sometimes the figures can be as high as 
three quarters of the issued shares of the companies. For example, China National 
Aviation Corporation, representing the Chinese national government, owns and controls 
70.502% (or more specifically, 70.502%0 & 70.502%C) of China National Aviation 
Company Limited (lllO.hk; see Figure A9) through its wholly controlled corporation, 
China National Aviation Corporation (Group) Limited. Another China-affiliated 
corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Limited (0349.hk; see 
Figure AlO), is directly controlled by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
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(75.00%0 & 75.00%C) on behalf of the Chinese national government. Besides, MTR 
Corporation Limited (0066.hk; see Figure All) , the only (partially) privatized 
corporation of the government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region till now, is 
still 76.550% owned and controlled by the HKSAR government (76.550%0 & 
76.550%C) whose officers are employed as non-executive directors in the board of 
directors of MTRC. Nevertheless, despite its less severe problem from the perspective of 
agency theory, state-owned enterprises are often notorious for pursuing many other 
different objectives besides profit maximization, which could be inefficient to the 
，A economy. 
26 See Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh (1994) for evidences of the performances of newly 
privatized firms in different countries, and Boubaki and Cosset (1998) who focus the same issue in 
developing countries. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (2000b) for an agenda for the 
possible reforms of the poor corporate governance problems with state-owned corporations as well. 
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Chapter 5 
Examples of Typical Ownership Patterns 
As noted in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000) and Lins (2003), the uses of pyramidal ownership structures and cross-
holdings in East Asian economies allow insiders to exercise effective (de facto) controls 
over the companies, even if their ownership rights are not comparable with the control 
rights. Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002), in addition, add that this 
separation of ownership and control rights can be further enhanced with the aids of 
additional (multiple) control chains. In other words, all of these instruments provide large 
shareholders with the tools necessary to expropriate minority interests with minimal 
capital injections. Some examples of expropriation of minority interests in East Asia can 
be found in Table 1 of Johnson et al. (2000).^^ Though Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000) and our study find that less than a half of sample corporations in Hong Kong 
employ these control-enhancing mechanisms (see, again, Panel C of Table 2), it does not 
mean that separation of ownership and control rights and the likely expropriation of 
minority interests is not severe. In addition, our methodology to treat private companies 
as wholly owned by the concentrated owners does bias our results toward finding less 
pyramiding schemes. Therefore, it is necessary to illustrate how these control-enhancing 
schemes are operated; and at the same time how these ownership and control rights 
27 See, in addition, La Porta et al. (2000c) for some other example of value transfer from publicly 
owned corporations to privately owned ones of the major shareholders of a firm in the United States and 
Europe. As the authors point out, some of the forms are even not legally prohibited, especially in the civil 
law jurisdictions. 
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calculated. This task will be performed with the aids of three examples below. 
5.1 The Li, Ka-Shing Business Group 
The first one concerns about the largest business group in Hong Kong in terms of market 
capitalization, the Li, Ka-Shing group. The Li, Ka-Shing business group has been 
researched extensively, and is used as an example to show the complexity of structure of 
business groups in many studies.^^ However, we argue that ours is a better reflection of 
the latest picture of the group. At the dawn of the new millennium, Li, Tzar-Kai Richard, 
the younger son of the helm of the group, Li, Ka-Shing, acquired Hong Kong Telecom, a 
monopolist of the telecommunication industry in Hong Kong at that time, and became the 
Pacific Century CyberWorks Limited (0008.hk) now after some restructuring exercises. 
As stated earlier, we do not separate individual family members. The new business chain 
of the PCCW group is therefore incorporated into the Li, Ka-Shing group for analysis, 
resulting in the complete picture of Figure 3a. 
[Insert Figure 3a here] 
Figure 3a presents the inter-connections of corporations in the Li, Ka-Shing group and 
the related, one of the most complex case in the sample which illustrate pyramiding 
schemes, holding through multiple control chains, and the presence of multiple owners. 
28 For examples, Taylor (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) have used the Li, Ka-Shing business group as an illustrative example. 
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In this figure (and all other figures showing the structures of business groups), hard lines 
indicate pyramiding or the major controlling stakes while dotted lines indicate other 
additional (multiple) control chains. Ownership stakes are denoted by "O" and control 
rights by "C". Direct ownership and control, that is, the immediate owners as shown in 
company reports, are shown alongside each arrows whereas the ownership and control 
stakes of the concentrated (ultimate) owners (the Li family in this case) are shown in each 
individual firm are printed in the boxes of the firms. In some cases when more than one 
concentrated owner have substantial shareholdings in the same firm, their respective 
ownership and control rights are indicated in the boxes of the firms with some specific 
signs distinguishing their respective holdings. If a corporation in the figure is a listed 
company in the Hong Kong, it is indicated with its stock code in a bracket after its name. 
To simplify the diagrams, we drop the percentage sign when denoting the ownership and 
control stakes. However, readers are reminded that all of the numbers in the ownership 
and control stakes represent percentages of ownership (out of the issued shares) and 
control (out of all voting shares) rights respectively. 
We follow the standard procedure in the literature when calculating control rights. That is, 
the "weakest-link-in-the-chain" method. Technically, control rights of a particular 
corporation for the ultimate owner are assumed to be the minimum number of control 
rights along the pyramid chains. The total control right for a particular shareholder in a 
specific firm is calculated by adding the control rights in all individual chains.^^ 
29 Lemmon and Lins (2003) use a different definition of control stakes for the concentrated owner. 
They use the control right of the immediate owner of a corporation as the proxy of the control stake 
enjoyed by the concentrated owner, instead of the "weakest link" method. For example, in Figure 3a, the Li 
family controls 84.583% of Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings under this methodology. 
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The rationale of the calculations of ownership and control stakes can best be illustrated 
with the Li-trusts-CKH-HWL-CKI-HKE chain on the left hand side of Figure 3a. First of 
all, it is important to point out that none of the corporations in the figure use multiple 
classes of shares. Therefore, O equals to C alongside each arrow. Here, the Li family 
wholly own their family trusts (as represented by the issued shares of Li Ka-shing Unity 
Trustee Company Limited, Li Ka-shing Unity Trustee Corporation Limited, among others, 
which is not shown in the diagram separately), which in turn, own and control 36.208% 
of the issued shares of Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, CKH, (OOOl.hk). This is the 
only chain of control of Cheung Kong by family Li and no pyramid is used. Therefore, 
we claim that family Li owns and controls 36.208% of the issued shares of CKH, where 
ownership (O) is calculated by multiplying the ownership stakes of family Li in their 
family trusts and in turn, their ownership rights in CKH, or 100% * 36.208% = 36.208%. 
Control (C), on the other hand, is calculated by the weakest link along this control chain, 
or min(100%,36.208%) = 36.208% . 
By the same way, the ownership and control of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (OOlS.hk), 
HWL by the family Li, are (100% * 36.208% * 49.9%) + (100% * 0.025%) = 18.093% and 
min(l00%,36.208%,49.9%) + min(l00%,0.025%) = 36.233% respectively, where the 
second terms in both formulas represent the additional control chain "Li-trusts-HWL", 
represented by the dotted line in the figure. Similarly, there are three separate chains 
connecting family Li to Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited (1038.hk). One of 
these chains, Li-trusts-HWL-CKI, may need further explanations. Here, family Li's 
ownership rights result from this chain is as usual, the product of the ownership stake in 
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this chain, or 100% * 0.025% *84.583% = 0.0211% . However, weakest link of control 
stake from this chain is inin( 100%,0.025%,0%) = 0% . It is because HWL controls 
84.583% of CKI directly; so this 84.583% stake in CKI has already been considered in 
the pyramid (major) chain and should not be counted again. Therefore, we use 0% here. 
Figure 3b summaries these calculations. 
[Insert Figure 3b here] 
This example illustrates how control-enhancing mechanisms serve to make the ownership 
and control rights differ from one another. It is also easy to compute the O/C ratios of the 
four corporations in this chain, CKH, HWL, CKI, and HKE, as 1.000’ 0.499, 0.425, and 
0.163 respectively. When the company does not employ these mechanisms at all, as is the 
case of CKH, 1% of ownership stakes is required to have 1% of control rights of the 
company. However, after repeated uses of pyramiding for several times, a large 
derivation from one-man-one-share resulted. In particular, we find that buying 0.163% of 
the issued shares of Hong Kong Electric is all that needed, for the Li family, to achieve 
1% of control rights in that utility corporation. In this way, we claim that the ultimate 
owner has the incentive as well as the ability to entrench and expropriate the interests of 
other shareholders. 
One would also find a striking consequence from the extensive uses of control-enhancing 
mechanisms in the case of Hutchison Habor Ring Limited (0715.hk) at the bottom left 
comer of Figure 3a. We have identified two ultimate owners, the family Li and Luk, 
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Chung-Lam, for this corporation. While family Li owns 9.125% of Hutichison Labor 
Ring through pyramiding, Luk owns 21.061% directly. However, the former controls 
36.208% of the control rights of this listed company. The latter, on the other hand, 
controls 21.061% only without the “benefit” from the control-enhancing tools. The 0/C 
ratios for Li and Luk are 0.252 and 1.000 respectively. In other words, the cost of 
controlling this corporation is much lower for family Li. They, again, have the incentive 
as well as the ability to expropriate other shareholders. Note that the second shareholder 
here, Luk Chung-Lam controls more than 10% of the votes and at the same time, family 
Li controls less than 50%. We therefore say multiple owners exist in Hutchison Habor 
Ring. The same conclusion is drawn for two other corporations, PCCW and Pacific 
Century Insurance Holdings Limited (0065.hk), in the same group. 
The same logics apply to the pyramid chains on the right hand side in Figure 3a. By 
repeated pyramiding and multiple control chains, the family becomes the largest 
shareholder of both PCCW and Pacific Century Insurance, with 0/C ratios of 0.782 and 
0.890 in the two firms respectively. Again, please see the ownership rights, control rights, 
and the ratio of the ownership to control rights for the largest shareholders in all of the 
sampled corporations in Table Al in the appendix. 
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5.2 The Swire Group 
Next we study a case of connection between a state and a corporate entity in Figure 4’ 
where not only pyramiding and multiple control chains, but also dual classes of shares are 
used. The structure of the firms in this group is printed in Figure 4. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
The same methodology in the Li, Ka-Shing group is employed here. On the left hand side, 
we can see how the Chinese national government owns a listed corporation in Hong 
Kong, CITIC Pacific Limited (0267.hk) through pyramiding and multiple control chains. 
On the opposite side, how a corporate concentrated owner, the John Swire & Sons 
Limited, controls Swire Pacific Limited (0019.hk, 0087.hk) through pyramiding and dual 
classes of shares. As mentioned earlier, Swire Pacific issues two classes of shares, "A" 
and "B". Shares of both classes carry the same voting rights but issued at different par 
values. The par value of "A" share is HK$0.12 per share while that of "B" share is 
HK$0.60 per share. Therefore, ownership stake can be calculated by (no. of "A" share 
hold*0.12 + no. of "B" shares hold*0.60) / (total no. of "A" shares issued*0.12 + total no. 
of "B" shares issued*0.60). As the voting rights of both classes are the same, we calculate 
the control stake as if there is only class of shares. By holding much more "A" shares, 
John Swire & Sons is able to control Swire Pacific in excess of its cash flow right, 
resulting in an O/C ratio of 0.558. Note that there are three more substantial corporate 
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owners for Swire Pacific, namely the Capital Group Co., Brandes Investment Partners, 
and Franklin Resources Incorporation. However, all of them hold more "B" shares than 
"A" shares, resulting in control rights fall short of ownership rights. 0/C for the three 
corporate entities is 2.577, 2.578, and 4.295 respectively. In this sense, we conclude that 
the cost of control in Swire Pacific for Franklin Resources Inc. (with 0/C=4.295) is 
nearly eight times of that of John Swire & Sons (4.295/0.558=7.697). 
In the bottom of Figure 4, we observe a connection between the East and the West in 
Cathay Pacific Airways Limited (0293.hk). We find that Cathay is jointly owned by John 
Swire & Sons (12.869%0 & 45.847%C) and the Chinese national government (7.887%0 
& 25.808%C) through their subsidiaries Swire Pacific and CITIC Pacific respectively. 
Again John Swire & Sons，the largest owner of Cathay, controls with a lower cost 
(0/C=0.281) than the second largest shareholder, the Chinese national government 
(0/C=0.306). Similar argument applies to the last firm in the chain, Hong Kong Aircraft 
Engineering Company Limited (0044.hk). 
5.3 The Kuok, Khoon-Ean Business Group 
The last example we employ, in contrast, is a rather simple one. Here the Kerry Group of 
Kuok, Khoon-Ean controls three listed corporations in Hong Kong by a much flatter 
corporate structure. Figure 5 shows this organization structure. 
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[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Unlike the Li, Ka-Shing group, the Chinese government, nor the corporate concentrated 
owner John Swire & Sons group, Kuok controls three listed corporations, Kerry 
Properties Limited (0683.hk), SCMP Group Limited (0583.hk), and Shangri-La Asia 
Limited (0069.hk), in three separate business chains without uses of any control-
enhancing mechanisms mentioned earlier. This results in 0/C ratios of 1.000 in all of the 
three listed corporations for the Kuok family, implying no separation of ownership and 
control rights. We conclude, therefore, expropriations of minority interests are much less 




The univariate statistics on ownership structure and auditing fee in Table 1 provide some 
preliminary results for the relationship between corporate governance and external 
auditing in Hong Kong. However, to control for variables other than ownership structure 
that differs across firms and industries that may affect auditing fee, we use a regression 
framework. We perform all models using ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications. 
6.1 The Variables 
The dependent variable is the auditing rate at the end of 2001. The main independent 
variables are the ownership-structure-related factors. We include ownership (O) to test 
the incentive effects of the largest shareholders in running their firms properly when their 
ownership rights increases, as reflected in the auditing rate spent. We also include control 
minus ownership (C-0) to test the entrenchment effects of the controlling shareholders 
when there is separation between ownership and control rights they enjoyed. As 
alternatives to (C-0), we employ control exceeds ownership dummy (C>0), and control 
exceeds ownership, high, dummy (C>>0), both of which concern a yes-or-no answer to 
the question whether separations of ownership and control of the concentrate shareholder 
do matter in determinations of auditing rate. The dummies equal to one when ownership 
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stakes do not coincide with control stakes. The latter dummy equals to one only when this 
separation is higher than the mean of this separation among the firms that C>0. Lastly 
we put in control to ownership ratio multiple group {C/O"^group) to see how the cross 
effects of separation of ownership and control rights and group affiliation affect the 
amount of auditing fee they willing to pay. 
As control variables we include the log of firm size (book value of total assets), leverage 
(ratio of total debt to total asset on balance sheets), total cash, multiple owner dummy, 
group dummy, owner-manager duality dummy, LargeCap dummy, and the auditor firms. 
We also adjust for industry effects by adding industry dummies. 
As noted, we have nine industries in the sample. We therefore have eight industry 
dummies, where the remaining one, manufacturing, is used as the numeraire. 
Alternatively, we use the opaque dummy for some specifications. Total cash represents 
the amount of cash a company hold at the end of the financial year 2001, which may also 
be a determinant of the amount of auditing fee a company willing to pay. 
We follow Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) in defining multiple owners. We say 
multiple owners present in a corporation when someone besides the largest shareholder 
owns "at least 10% of the voting [control] right...However, a large owner who controls 
more than half of the votes is classified as the single controller" (p. 93). The role of the 
second largest owner is not well surveyed in the literature. An exception is Faccio, Lang 
and Young (2001), who argue that presence of a second large owner in corporations in 
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Asia tend to collude with the largest shareholder in expropriating minority interests. 
They, however, use dividend yields as the dependent variable. We therefore extend their 
study by investigating whether the same effects exist in determining the auditing fees. 
By using a sample of 400 firms in five East Asian economies, Mitton (2002) concludes 
that those using the accounting "big-six" tend to perform better than others during the 
East Asia financial crisis. However, only one sampled corporation in our data uses non-
"big-five" in 2001.^® We therefore modify Mitton (2002) by investigating the firm 
specific effects of the big five. This result in four auditor-firm dummies in the 
regressions, and the one left out, Arthur Anderson, is used as the numeraire. For 
simplicity, the only firm that employs non-big-five audit firm is also included in Arthur 
Anderson. 
Lastly, we hypothesize reputation and sound track records are a substitute for external 
audit. We therefore expect auditing fee spent by the largest corporations to be lower than 
others. This is reflected by the LargeCap dummy, which equals to one if the sample firm 
comes from the Hang Seng HK LargeCap Index. 
The definitions of all variables have been discussed here and introduced in earlier 
sections are summarized in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Arthur Anderson has not merged with other audit firms yet in 2001. Therefore, we can still find 
some corporations employing Arthur Anderson as the auditor. 
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6.2 Regression Results and Discussions 
As noted in chapter 1, our multivariate analyses focus on two major questions about the 
effects of ownership and control concentration on auditing fee. The first question is how 
the relationship between ownership structures and auditing fee varies. The second is how 
the above relationship changes if the concentrated owner is also the manager or key 
executive of the firm. While the first question needs still some closer investigation, the 
second one is much more straightforward. 
Table 5 presents regression results of our first series of our regression models, which 
links the industry-unadjusted auditing rate (lAAudit) to the ownership and control of the 
largest (ultimate) shareholder using the full sample {n= 112).^ ^ 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The table presents four specifications of the OLS regressions. Specification 1 and 2 are 
the full models, with all variables but opaque in Table 4 included. Specification 3 and 4 
represent the restricted models where the eight industry dummies and the four audit-firm 
dummies removed. The four models also differ in dealing with the separation of 
ownership and control rights of the largest owner. The two odd-numbered specifications 
31 While not tabulated, readers are informed that as alternatives to the computations of industry-
adjusted auditing rates in the current version of this paper, we have also performed regression analyses by 
using the "excess over the minimum" approach in adjusting for industry effect. Specifically, instead of 
subtracting industry average auditing rate from unadjusted auditing rates paid by firms, we use the excess 
auditing rate spent by individual corporation over the firm that pay the least in auditing rate in that industry. 
Similar results to that presented here are found. This enhances the credibility of the empirical results. 
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use the continuous variable C-0 to test the entrenchment effects whereas the even-
numbered ones use the two discrete dummies C>0 and C»0 for this task. 
Entrenchment Effect 
We find from specification 1 and 3 that increased separation of ownership and control 
rights of the largest shareholders is associated with lower industry-adjusted auditing rates. 
For example, a one percent increases in the gap between ownership and control stakes of 
the largest shareholder decreases audit rate by 0.006693% (in specification 1). Sampled 
corporations employing control-enhancing mechanisms spend 0.077137% less in audit 
rate (in specification 2). In other words, the coefficients associated with both control 
minus ownership variable (C-0) and control exceeds ownership dummy ( C � 0 ) are 
statistically significant at standard levels. This implies, in general, corporations that 
employ control-enhancing mechanisms, which lead to separation of ownership and 
control rights for the largest shareholders, spend less on external auditing after removing 
the industry effects. 
In addition, all of the regressions show that auditing rate is negatively related to the 
variable control to ownership ratio multiply group, or O/C^group. The coefficients of this 
variable are statistically significant (at 1 percent for specifications 1 and 2，and 10 percent 
for specifications 3 and 4). This shows that auditing fees spent by group-affiliated 
corporations that use control-enhancing mechanisms tends to be lower than other 
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sampled firms. Also note that the variable of group-affiliation shows that business groups 
tends to pay more for external monitoring since the coefficients in all of the four 
specifications are positive and significant (discussed later). Therefore, the significant 
negative coefficient corresponds to 0/C*group must have resulted from the separation 
between ownership and control rights, 0/C. 
All of above findings suggest that corporations that employ control-enhancing tools like 
pyramiding, dual class of shares, cross holdings, among others, do spend less on external 
monitoring. These firms are controlled by the large shareholders who do not rely on 
external auditors for corporate control or monitoring and they wish to keep information 
private and not release it to the small shareholders. This, in other words, represents the 
entrenchment effect of minority interests by large and dominant shareholders in Hong 
Kong is severe and economically significant. 
This confirms our conjecture that large shareholders tend to restrict financial 
transparency, especially when their ownership rights are not comparable to their control 
rights. The incremental benefit from increased auditing expense is not comparable to the 
cost associated with decreased in private perks enjoyed. Consider a very simple example. 
Assume that a large shareholder owns and controls x% of the issued shares in Firm A, 
which in turns owns and control x% in Firm B. The exercise is repeated four times to 
Firm D. Then the large shareholder of Firm A effectively owns x* of the ownership right 
in Firm D but controls x% of Firm D in the absence of other control-enhancing tools. 
More generally, a large shareholder owns only x" of the ownership right after pyramiding 
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n times in the above case. The 0/C ratio in the n^ firm is efficiently x"人 In the case 
above, if we assume a strict condition of controlling 51 percent of a listed company is 
what required to gain effective control of the firm, then the 0/C ratio in Firm D for the 
large shareholder just mentioned is 0.133. If, instead, we follow the standard figure in the 
literature that 20 percent of ownership is what needed to gain de facto control, then the 
large shareholder's 0/C ratio in Firm D reduced to 0.008 only. In other word, he has to 
own only 0.008 percent of the issued shares of Firm D to control 1 percent of the voting 
rights in Firm D. Therefore, the rapidly declining in 0/C ratio implies that control simply 
outright the benefit of increased monitoring in form of auditing. That is why 
entrenchment effect is dominant, as also noted in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999), Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), La Porta et al, (2000b, 2002), among 
others. 
Size Effect 
Among other explanatory variables, firm size, leverage, and group-affiliation have 
significant explanatory power, with size and leverage showing negative relationships and 
the last one showing a positive relationship with audit fee a firm spend, as noted just 
above. 
The first finding is quite easy to understand, because a higher total asset represents higher 
book value of the firm. Higher book values often link to bigger scales and larger firms, 
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whose better track records and reputation may serve as substitutes for tight external 
monitoring. Another reason for the significant size effect may be linked to an inherent 
shortcoming of the methodology of the paper. Specifically, since the auditor's monitoring 
technology is unknown in our models, we do not have any information regarding the 
concavity or convexity of the production function of the external auditing party. In short, 
the lesser auditing rates of largest corporations spent in auditing may not be wholly 
contributed by the increased reputation. It would well be attributed partly to the 
economics of scale of increased monitoring capacities. 
Leverage 
The second finding suggests that increases in debt-to-asset ratios tend to decrease the 
auditing fee corporations willing pay. It may seem strange at first sight, as stricter 
monitoring may be needed for increased debts corporations incur. However, a plausible 
reason would be that as debts become more predominant, the major role of corporate 
monitoring shifts to the creditors, especially banks or other financial institutions. These 
corporate entities often have their monitoring methods other than relying on audit firms. 
This result is a decreased amount of monitoring by external auditors, as reflected in the 
auditing rates of the companies. 
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Group -affiliation 
The last result suggests that group-affiliation tends to increase external auditing for the 
sampled corporations. This implies business groups tend to increase auditing fee 
voluntarily to alleviate concerns of other investors for being expropriated. Furthermore, 
the increased business connections and intra-group transactions decrease the transparency 
of the information available to the public as the structures of business groups become 
more complex. Increases of auditing fees may also be necessary for auditors to perform 
their functions properly. In other words, while the increased related-party transactions 
and the increased concerns of outside investors for information transparency may be good 
reasons to raise concern of corporate insiders to spend more on auditing to provide good 
signals of corporate governance to outsiders, it would also be possible that the increased 
expenditures on external auditing would be required by the auditor the cover their costs in 
performing their statutory duties. 
Other Variables 
The regressions also suggest negative incentive effects when the ownership rights of the 
largest shareholders increase. This result, however, is not significant at standard levels. 
Besides, other firm-specific variables are statistically insignificant in all of the four 
specifications. While not tabulated, regressions results show that when unadjusted 
auditing rate {Audit) is used as the dependent variable, the information transparency 
» 
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dummy, opaque, is statistically significant at the one percent level. This shows that 
information transparency is correlated with the industry structures, and thus the resulting 
monitoring cost of the corporations. When using the eight industry dummies instead, 
however, the only statistically significant comes from financial institution, properties and 
construction, and technology only. 
6.3 Restricted Models 
As noted, state-owned enterprises can have different social or political objectives other 
than profit maximization. This means that they can have other considerations when 
deciding the optimal auditing levels. To analyze corporate governance and ownership 
structures of non-govemment owned corporations, we drop all the state-owned sample 
firms out. The firms without any concentrated owners are dropped at the same time. This 
is because the corporate behaviors of these firms may also be different from that with 
concentrated owner, who then have a much stronger and clearer incentive to expropriate 
other shareholders. As a result, we leave only family-controlled and corporate-entity-
controlled corporations in the reduced sample set. That is, corporations with concentrated 
owners and whose identities are either a families or corporate entities. As is in Table 3， 
we define three different cutoff levels, the 10-, 20- and 40-percent ones, when defining 
different types of concentrated owners. However, as Table 3 shows that the owner-type 
pattern does not change at all when switching the 10 percent level to the 20 percent cutoff 
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level, we effectively have only two cutoff levels. The relationship between audit fee and 
corporate governance variables of the restricted model is reported in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We present four specifications in Table 6 as well. The first two define control level at 10 
percent (or 20 percent) control level and the last two define that at 40 percent. As a result, 
the number of observations reduces to 97 from 112 in specification 1 and 2 and to 59 in 3 
and 4. As before, the odd-numbered specifications use the continuous variable C-0 as the 
proxy of separation of ownership and control rights for the largest shareholders while the 
even-numbered ones uses the two discrete dummies C>0 and C»0 for that in 
specification 3 and 4. 
One important change in this reduced sample is that the sign of the coefficient for the 
variable ownership shifts from negative to positive, showing a positive relationship 
between the auditing fee a firm spends and its ownership structure, an incentive effect of 
the large shareholdings. However, this finding is not statistically significant at standard 
levels, which is largely due to the small number of observations. 
The regression results do not appear to change significantly in Table 6. Most of the 
significant results in Table 5 remain statistically significant in the reduced dataset, with a 
few exceptions only. For example, the variables control minus ownership (C-0), control 
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exceeds ownership (C>0), and control exceeds ownership, high (C>>0), are not 
significant at standard levels now. This may also due to the small sample effects. 
On the other hand, most coefficients of the economically significant variables in 
specification 3 and 4 are higher than their counterparts in specification 1 and 2. This 
shows that at a stricter de facto control level, the economic effects of the variables on 
auditing fee are stronger than those at the lower cutoffs. For example, the variable group 
affiliation is statistically significant at all of the four specifications. The coefficients of 
this variable, group, in specification 1,2, 3, and 4 are 0.2269, 0.2727, 0.3141, and 0.3863 
respectively. This implies that group-affiliated corporations pay 0.2269% (in 
specification 1) more on auditing rate when group is defined as either 10 percent or 20 
percent levels. However, at 40 percent cutoff level group-affiliated firms pay some 
0.3141% more (in specification 3) than the stand-alone firms, a higher figure than that in 
the lower levels. 
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Chapter 7 
Some Concluding Remarks 
We study the expropriation of minority interests by the largest shareholders by using a 
newly assembled small dataset of 112 listed corporations in Hong Kong that derive most 
of their revenue in the economy from the perspective of auditing fees, a monitoring cost 
that the corporate insiders have some degrees of discretion to choose strategically. While 
narrow in scope, we believe this option for corporate insiders do provide a more direct 
measure of corporate governance than the earlier studies. In this sense, external auditing 
provides a good platform at which the corporate insiders can choose the "optimal level of 
expropriation" at greater discretion. 
We provide additional evidence to the existing literature about the genuine picture of the 
ownership structure in the Hong Kong. We confirm that family-controlled corporations 
are the most predominant form of corporations in the economy. We also show that 
pyramiding schemes are the most common control-enhancing mechanism employed by 
large shareholders in the economy whereas cross holdings and multiple-class of shares 
are rare, consistent to the findings of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). 
By employing a regression framework, we show positive incentive effects of the largest 
shareholders and negative entrenchment effects of them when their control rights in the 
corporations are higher than their ownership rights, though the former effects are not 
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economically significant. Lastly, our results provide evidences that group-affiliated 
corporations in Hong Kong do pay more for external monitoring. 
In brief, the evidence is consistent with the view that corporate structure plays an 
important role in determining the incentives of corporate insiders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. As becoming an increasingly concerning topic in both the literature and the 
corporate world, we hope our findings add to our understanding of the corporate 
governance in the economy and provide additional guidance to policymakers and 
corporate insiders in the ongoing debate and continued reform of corporate governance 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 Description of Regression Variables 
"^riables Description — 
Audit The auditing fee a corporation spends at the financial year 2001, 
measured by the auditing fee a company spends as a percentage 
of total turnover (or revenue) of the year, defined as the auditing 
rate 
lAAudit Industry-adjusted auditing fee a company spends at the financial 
year 2001，measured as a percentage of total turnover (or 
revenue). We first compute for each industry the mean of auditing 
fee in the industry. Then the industry-adjusted auditing rate is 
defined by subtracting the unadjusted auditing rate from the 
industry average 
Ownership (O) The ownership rights of the largest shareholder of a corporation, 
measured as the percentage of the shares held by the large 
shareholders out the total shares issued 
Control (C) The control rights of the largest shareholder of a corporation, 
measures as the percentage of voting shares held by the large 
shareholders out the total voting shares issued 
Control minus A continuous variable measuring the difference between the 
ownership (C-0) control rights and ownership rights held in the hands of the largest 
shareholders 
Control exceeds A dummy equal to one if control rights are higher than ownership 
ownership (C>0) rights of the largest shareholders, and zero otherwise 
Control exceeds A dummy equal to one if control rights are higher than ownership 
ownership, high rights and if this separation is higher than the mean separation in 
(C»0) corporations where control and ownership differ, and zero 
otherwise 
Multiple owner Multiple largest shareholders dummy = 1 if more than one large 
ultimate owners exist, zero otherwise. We say multiple owners 
present when someone besides the largest shareholder owns at 
least 10% of the voting right. However, a large owner who 
‘ controls more than half of the votes is classified as the single 
controller, adapted from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
Firm size Log of the total assets from the balance sheets of the corporations 
at the financial year 2001 
Leverage Ratio of total debts to total assets from the balance sheets of the 
corporations at the financial year 2001 
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Cash Total amount of cash hold at the end of the financial year 2001 
Group Group affiliation dummy = 1 if a corporation is group-affiliated, 
zero otherwise. A corporation is said to be "group affiliated" 
when any one of the following criteria is satisfied. (/) it is 
controlled by a shareholder via pyramiding; (") it controls another 
corporation in the sample; {Hi) it has the same controlling 
(ultimate) shareholder as at least one other corporation in the 
sample; and (/v) its controlling shareholder is a widely held firm, 
either financial or non-financial; adapted from Faccio, Lang and 
Young (2001) 
Duality Owner-manager duality dummy = 1 for the case of duality, zero 
otherwise. A corporation is recognized as owner-manager duality 
when a member of the controlling family or an employee of the 
controlling corporate entities is the CEO, chairman, honorary 
chairman, or vice-chairman of the company; adapted from 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
Opaque Information transparency dummy = 1 if the corporation comes 
form the opaque industry, zero otherwise. An industry is defined 
as opaque when its businesses and industry structures are not 
transparent and difficult to monitor 
Industry Industries dummies alternate to information transparency dummy. 
A total of nine industries in the sample, classified according to 
their core businesses and income sources. These industries 
include banking, conglomerate, financial institution, hotel and 
tourism, manufacturing, media, property and construction, 
technology, and utility and government regulated. This results in 
eight industry dummies, where manufacturing is excluded to 
avoid multi-collinearity 
Audit firm The auditing firm a corporation employs in 2001. Only one firm 
in the sample used non-big-5 auditing firms in the sampled year. 
This results in four audit firm dummies, including Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Emst & Young, KPMG, and PriceWater 
House Coopers. Arthur Anderson is excluded to avoid multi-
collinearity (and the only firm that employs non-big-5 is grouped 
into AA for analysis). 
LargeCap Large firm dummy = 1 if the corporation is a large firm; = 0 
otherwise. A corporation is recognized a large firm if it comes 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure Al HSBC Holdings PLC 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the HSBC group and the related. Hard lines indicate 
control stakes. Ownership stakes are donated by “0” and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes 
are shown alongside each airow, while HSBC's ownership and control stakes are shown n each firm's box. Brackets 
after the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as 
percentage. Note that no pyramiding is used in this case. 
HSBC Holdings PLC (005) 
lOOO&C 
\ r 
HSBC Finance (Netherlands) 
(100 O&C, 0/C=1.0) 
100 o & c 
> r 
HSBC Holdings BV 
(100 O&C，0/C=1.0) 
lOOO&C y r 




HSBC Asia Holdings BV 
(100 O&C，0/C=1.0) 
mo O & C \ r 
The HongKong and Shanghai 
Banking Corp. Ltd 
(100 0&?，0/C=1.0) 
6 4 . 1 8 � &C 
I [ 
Hang Seng Bank Ltd (Oil) 
(64.18 O&C’ 0/C=1.0) 
74 
Figure A2 The Bank of East Asia 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Bank of East Asia. Hard lines indicate control 
stakes. Ownership stakes are donated by “0” and control stakes by "C". Brackets after the company names, if any, 
represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramiding 
is used in this case. 
Li, Fook-Sum Alan Li, Kwok-Po David 
(Director) (CEO) 
1.236 0 & C 4 .6030&C 
• y 
The Bank of East Asia (023) 
75 
Figure A3 JCG Holdings Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Teh business group and the related, a case 
of pyramiding. Hard lines indicate pyramiding. Ownership stakes are donated by "O" and control stakes by 
"C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside each arrow, while Family Teh's ultimate 
ownership and control stakes are shown in the first row in each firm's box. Other substantial owners' 
ownership and control stakes, if any, are shown in other rows in the firms' boxes. Brackets after the 
company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as 
percentage. 
Teh, Hong-Piow and family 
26.92 C &C 
1 [ 
Public Bank Berhad 
(26.92 O&C’ 0/C=1.0) 
59.3 O & C 
1 [ 
JCG Holdings Ltd (626) 
(15.963 0 & 26.92’ 0/C=0.59) 
100 O & C 75 O & C 
T ^ r 
JCG Finance Co. Ltd Winton Holdings (Bermuda) 
(15.963 0 & 26.92 C,0/C=0.59) (11.972 O & 26.9^ C’ 0 / 0 0 . 4 4 ) 
76 
Figure A4 Moulin International Holdings Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Ma business group and the related. Hard 
lines indicate ownership stakes and dotted lines indicate additional ownership stakes. Ownership stakes are 
donated by "O" and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside each 
arrow, while Family Ma's ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown in the first row in each firm's 
box. Other substantial owners' ownership and control stakes, if any, are shown in other rows in the firms' 
boxes. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All 
numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramiding is used. 
Ma, Bo-Kee and family i 
100 o&c I 
Y I 
(Family trusts) I 
lOOO&C I 
\ [ I 
BNP Jersey Trust Corp Ltd I 
(100 0&C’0/C=1.0) j 
100 O & C I 
] ’ I 
KFL Holdings Ltd | 
(100 0&C，0/C=1.0) I 
T I 0.624 40.821 O & C 10 &C 
^ r 
Moulin International Holdings (389) < ‘ 
(41.445 0&C，0/C=1.0) 
77 
Figure A5 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited, a Case of Common Family Name 
but Not from the Same Family Group 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Yue Yuen, a case of directors with common last 
names but not from the same family group, and multiple substantial owners. Hard lines indicate major ownership 
stakes while dotted lines indicate multiple control chains. Ownership stakes are donated by "O" and control stakes 
by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside each arrow, while Tasi, Chi-Jui and Tasi, David N. 
F.'s ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown n each firm's box. To avoid confusion, the ownership and 
control of the Tsai, Chi-Jui is indicated with "C" while that of Tasi, David N. F. indicated with "D". Brackets after 
the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as 
percentage. 
Tsai, Chi-Jui Tasi, David N. F. 
moo&c ，r lOOO&C 
World Future Investments Ltd C:(100 0&C，0/C=1.0) ^ 
100 O & C Pou Chen Corporation 
± D : ( 1 0 0 0 & C ’ 0 / C = 1 . 0 ) 
Max Creation Industrial Ltd 1 C:(100 0&C’0/C=1.0) I 
— 1 I l O O O & C 
I 
l O O O & C 100 O & C I I i ± I i Quicksilver Profits Ltd Red Hot investment Ltd j Wealthplus Holdings Ltd c:(100 0&c.0/c=1.0) C:(100 0&C，0/C=1.0) I D:(100 0&C’0/C=1.0) I 
I 
I 
I 12.754 0 � C 10.834 0<::C 1.237 Q&C 37.8340 &C I 
i 
l> Yue Yuen Industrial (551) • D:(37.834 0&C，0/C=1.0) < C:(24.825 0&C.0/C=l.(r) 
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Figure A6 Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Tung business group and the related. Hard 
lines indicate the major control stake while dotted lines indicate multiple control chains. Ownership stakes 
are donated by "O" and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside 
each arrow, while Family Tung's ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown in the first row in each 
firm's box. Other substantial owners' ownership and control stakes, if any, are shown in other rows in the 
firms' boxes. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. 
All numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that King, Roger is also a family of the Tung family under 
our analyses, and no pyramid is used in this case. 





looo&c looo&c moo&c 
J r 1 r ^ r 
Springfield Corp. Whaencliff Ltd. Monterrey Ltd. 
(100 0&C’0/C=1.0) (100 0&C’0/C=1.0) (100 0&C，0/C=1.0) 
I 10.71 O & C 49.05 O & C | 4.917 O & C 
I T ‘ I 
‘ Orient Overseas (Int，1) Ltd. (316) | 
^ (64.677 0 & C，0/C= 1.0) p 
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Figure A7 Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Xian business group and the related. Hard 
lines indicate the major control stake while dotted lines indicate multiple control chains. Ownership stakes 
are donated by “0” and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside 
each arrow, while Family Xian's ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown in the first row in each 
firm's box. Other substantial owners' ownership and control stakes, if any, are shown in other rows in the 
firms' boxes. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. 
All numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramid is used in this case. 
Xian, Yong-Wei. and family 
100 O&C m o o & c ] r 1 r 
Jin Tai Finance Co. China Wan Tai Group 
(100 0&C，0/C=1.0) (100 0&C’0/C=1.0) 
I 40 O & C 60 O & C 
” ” 
j Universal Union Ltd. 
I (100 0&C’0/C=1.0) 
10.02 O&C 49.05 O&C 
y f 
I Sun Man Tai Holdings Co. Ltd. (433) 
^ (53.71 O&C’ 0/C=1.0) 
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Figure A8 The Lee, Shan-Kee Group (An Example of Cross Holdings) 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Lee business group and the related. Hard 
lines indicate pyramiding; dotted lines indicate multiple control chains, and the double dotted line indicates 
cross holdings. Ownership stakes are donated by "O" and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and 
control stakes are shown alongside each arrow, while Family Lee's ultimate ownership and control stakes 
are shown in the first row in each firm's box. Other substantial owners' ownership and control stakes, if 
any, are shown in other rows in the firms' boxes. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the 
stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as percentage. 
Lee, Shan-Kee and family 
100 o & c 
I r 




Henderson Development Ltd. Fu Sang Co. Ltd. 
( 1 0 0 0 & C， 0 / C = 1 . 0 ) 1 ( 1 0 0 0 & l : 0 / C = 1 . 0 ) 
6 4 . 4 6 6 O & C I I 
1 r 
Henderson Land Dev. Co. Ltd. (012) | I 
I (64.466 0 & f 0 / C = 1.0) 丨 | 
0.325 • ，州O & C I I 
O & C : I 1 • Kingslee S. A. I I 
• (64.466 0 & ( p ， 0 / C = 1 . 0 ) I I 
• 7 3 . 0 7 0 0 & C I I 0 . 1 9 9 3 O & C 
• I r I I 
I Henderson Investment Ltd. (097) ^ - j ‘ 
： ( 4 7 . 3 0 5 0 & 6 4 . 6 6 5 C，0 /C=0 .732) | 
: ” lOOO&C I 
I Timpani Investment Ltd. I ： (47.305 O & 64.665 C, 0/C=0.732) j 
I ” lOOO&C I 
• Disralei Investment Ltd. ' 
• ( 4 7 . 3 0 5 O & 6 4 . 6 6 5 C . Q / C = 0 . 7 3 2 ) | 
I 2 8 . 7 0 8 O & C I 0 . 0 6 9 3 O & C 
: ] r I 
The Hong Kong and China Gas Co. Ltd. (097) < ‘ 
(13.353 O & 28.777 C. 0/C=0.464) 
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Figure A9 China National Aviation Company Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the China National Aviation Company Limited and the 
related. Hard lines indicate control stakes. Ownership stakes are donated by “0” and control stakes by "C". Direct 
ownership and control stakes are shown alongside each arrow, while Chinese national government's ultimate 
ownership and control stakes are shown in each firm's box. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the 
stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramiding is used in 
this case. 
Chinese National Government 
100 o&c 
J 
China National Aviation Corp. 
(100 0&C’0/C=1.0) 
，� l O O O & C 
China National Aviation 
Corporation (Group) Ltd. 
(100 O&C，0/C=1.0) 
, , 70.502 O & C 
China National Aviation Co. Ltd. (1110) 
( 7 0 . 5 0 2 0 & C， 0 / C = 1.0) 
82 
Figure AlO ICBC (Asia) Limited 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) 
Limited and the related. Hard lines indicate control stakes. Ownership stakes are donated by “0” and control stakes 
by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are shown alongside each arrow, while Chinese national government's 
ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown n each firm's box. Brackets after the company names, if any, 
represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramiding 
is used in this case. 
Chinese National Government 
100 o & c 2 
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China 
(100 O&C，0/C=1.0) 
75.000 0 &C 
；I r 
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
ofChina (Asia) Ltd. (349) 
(75.000 O&C’ 0/C=1.0) 
83 
Figure A l l MTR Corporation 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the MTR Corporation. Hard lines indicate control 
stakes. Ownership stakes are donated by "O" and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes are 
shown alongside each arrow, while HKSAR government's ultimate ownership and control stakes are shown n each 
firm's box. Brackets after the company names, if any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers 
are expressed as percentage. Note that no pyramiding is used in this case. 
HKSAR Government 
76.550 0 &C 
，r 
MTR Corporation (066) 
(76.550 0&C，0/C=1.0) 
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Figure A12 The Liu, Lit-Man Group and Connections with China 
This figure describes the inter-connection of corporations in the Liu business group and the related, a case of 
pyramiding, and multiple substantial owners. Hard lines indicate pyramiding while dotted lines indicate multiple 
control chains. Ownership stakes are donated by "O" and control stakes by "C". Direct ownership and control stakes 
are shown alongside each arrow, while Family Liu's and the Chinese National Government's ultimate ownership 
and control stakes are shown in each firm's box. To avoid confusion, the ownership and control of the Liu family is 
indicated with "L" while that of the Chinese government indicated with "G". Brackets after the company names, if 
any, represent the stock codes of the listed companies. All numbers are expressed as percentage. 
Liu, Lit-Man and Family Chinese National Gov't 
m o o & c 
] r 
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co. 
• O & C G:(100 0&C,0/C=1.0) 
* 100 O & C 
Liu's Holding Ltd , r 
L:(1000&C，0/C=1.0) COSCO (Hong Kong) Group ^ 
1 9 . 3 ( 0 & C ^ ^ ^ C G : ( 1 0 0 0 平 0 / C = 1 . 0 ) _ 
54.8' O & C 
1 r I r 1 r 
Liu Chong Ring Investment (194) COSCO Pacific Ltd (1199) 
L:(64.64 0 &C’0/C=1.0) G:(54.87 O & C，0/C=1.0) 
l O O O & C 
lOOO&C 
1 r } r 
Liu Chong Hing Estate Co. Bauhinia 97. Ltd 
L:(64.64 0&C,0 /C=1 .0 ) G:(54.87 O & C’ 0/C=1.0) 
20.0(丨 O & C 
，r 
Liu Chong Hing Bank (1111) 
L:(29.159 0&45 .11 C’0/C=0.646) < 59.478 O & C 
G:n0.974 0 & 20.00 C.0/C=0.549) 1 r 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anderson, Ronald C.，and David M. Reeb, 2003, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance 58, 1301-1327. 
Bennedsen, Morten, and Daniel Wolfenzon, 2000，The balance of Power in Closely Held 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 113-139. 
Berle, A. Jr., and G. Means, 1932, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House). 
Boubaki, Naijess, and Jean-Clande Cosset, 1998，The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries, 
Journal of Finance 53, 1081-1110. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 1999, The 
Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, Disentangling 
the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders, Journal of Finance 
57,2741-2771. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Leora Klapper, 2003, Resolution of Corporate 
Distress in East Asia, Journal of Empirical Finance 10,199-216. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000, The Separation of 
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 81-112. 
DeAngelo, Harry, and Linda DeAngelo, 1985, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights: A 
Study of Public Corporations with Dual Class of Common Stocks, Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 33-69. 
Faccio, Mara, and Larry H. P. Lang, 2002, The Ultimate ownership of Western European 
Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365-395. 
Faccio, Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, and Leslie Young, 2001, Dividends and Expropriation, 
American Economic Review 91，54-78. 
Gomes, Armando, and Walter Novaes, 1999，Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate 
Governance, Unpublished Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton. 
91 
Harvey, Campbell R.，and Andrew H. Roper, 1999，The Asian Bet, in Alison Harwood, 
Robert E. Litan, Michael Pomerleano, ed.，Financial markets and Development: 
The Crisis in Emerging Markets (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.) 
Holdemess, Clifford G.，Randall S. Kroszner, and Dennis P. Sheehan, 1999, Were the 
Good Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great 
Depression, Journal of Finance 54, 435-470. 
Johnson, Simon, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric Friedman, 2000, Corporate 
Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 
141-186. 
La-Poita, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1997, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
La-Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate 
Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance 54,471-517. 
La-Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 
1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
La-Poita, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 
2000a, Agency Problems and Dividend Polices around the World, Journal of 
Finance 55, 1-33. 
La-Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 
2000b, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial 
Economics 58, 3-27. 
La-Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 
2000c, Tunnelling, American Economic Review 90,22-27. 
La-Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 
2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance 57, 
1147-1170. 
Lease, Ronald C., John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson, 1984, The Market Value 
of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations, Journal of Business 57, 
443-467. 
Levy, Haim, 1983, Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock, Journal of 
Finance 38, 79-93. 
Lins, Karl V.，2003, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159-184. 
92 
Lins, Karl V.，and Henri Servaes, 1999a, International Evidence on the Value of 
Corporate Diversification, Journal of Finance 54, 2215-2239. 
Lins, Karl V.，and Henri Servaes, 1999b, Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in 
Emerging Markets? Unpublished Working Paper, London Business School. 
McConnell, John J., and Henri Servaes, 1990，Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership 
and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
Megginson, William L.’ Robert Nash, and Mattias van Randenborgh, 1994，The Financial 
and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical 
Analysis, Journal of Finance 49,403-502. 
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1988，Managerial Ownership 
and Market Valuation: An empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20， 
293-315. 
Mitton, Todd, 2002, A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the 
East Asian Financial Crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 215-241. 
Nenova, Tatianna, 2001, The Value of a Corporate Vote and Private Benefits: 
Cross-Country Analysis, Manuscript, Harvard University. 
Raj an, Raghuram G, and Luigi Zingales, 2000, The Governance of New Enterprise, in 
Xavier Vives, ed., Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1988，Value Maximization and the Acquisition 
Process, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2,7-20. 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1997，A Survey of Corporate Governance, 
Journal of Finance 52, 737-783. 
Stulz, Rene M.’ 1988, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the 
Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics 20,25-54. 
Taylor, Michael, 1998，Have Cash, will Travel: Hong Kong is No Longer Big Enough for 
Property Tycoon Li Ka-Shing, Far Eastern Economic Review 5, 56-60. 
Tong, Chun, 2003, Who are Managing listed Companies in Hong Kong? A Survey of the 
Management Teams of the Corporations in Hang Seng Index, Hong Kong Economic 
Journal Monthly Jan 2003,4-18. 
Tirole, Jean, 2001, Corporate Governance, Econometrica 69，1-35. 
93 
Zeckhauser, Richard J.，and John Pound, 1990, Are Large Shareholders Effective 
Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance, in R. 
G. Hubbard, ed.，Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
94 
_ ‘ 
•y 
hTEiiOhOD 
saiJBjqLH >IHn3 
